Uniform-frequency records with obscured context

ABSTRACT

A computer system may perform substitutions for fields in a set of records, where performing a given substitution involves replacing a field in the set of records with a replacement field, and the substitutions remove the context information in the set of records while maintaining relevance of the set of records. Then, the computer system may generate an artificial set of records based, at least in part, on the set of records, where a given artificial record includes one or more modified portions of the set of records. Next, the computer system may combine the set of records and the artificial set of records into a second set of records, where at least some phrases or values in the second set of records are uniformly distributed.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION

The is application claims priority under 35 U.S.C. 120 as a Continuationof U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15/262,001, entitled“Uniform-Frequency Records with Obscured Context,” filed Sep. 11, 2016,which claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) to: U.S. ProvisionalApplication Ser. No. 62/217,804, entitled “System and Method forSeparate Storage of Identities and Sensitive Data,” filed on Sep. 12,2015, the contents of both of which are herein incorporated byreference.

BACKGROUND

Field

The described embodiments relate to techniques for securing records. Inparticular, the described embodiments relate to techniques for securingrecords by elimination context information with substitutions, and/or byadding additional artificial records in order to ensure a uniformdistribution of at least some phrases or values.

Related Art

While the large datasets can facilitate a wide variety of value-addedservices, such datasets are increasingly vulnerable to unauthorizedviewing and theft. In addition to significant financial harm, thesecriminal activities are particularly devastating in the case ofsensitive information, such as medical records for patients.Consequently, many countries have passed stringent laws and regulationsin attempt to protect medical records. For example, in the UnitedStates, Protected Health Information (PHI) in general is covered by theHealth Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) whileelectronic PHI (such as medical records) is covered by the HIPAASecurity Rule (SR).

Instead of mandating particular security infrastructure and techniques,the HIPAA SR provides a flexible framework that requires an organizationthat has access to or that handle electronic PHI to continuously assessand adapt their security procedures based on the maturity of theorganization, the security risks, and the approaches used by similarorganizations. In principle, this regulatory framework helpsorganizations dynamically improve their handling of electronic PHI. Ingeneral encryption is a widely used security technique in mostorganizations' HIPAA plans. For example, patient medical records andrelated sensitive information are often encrypted using symmetric orasymmetric key encryption, and/or using a cryptographic hashingfunction.

As the power of widely available computing systems has increased, theencryption key length has also been increased to make it more difficult(and, thus, more time consuming) to break the encryption. For example,most organizations use at least 128 or 256-bit encryption keys. Whilelonger encryption keys can increase the security of the electronic PHI,there is usually a cost in the form of increased encryption/decryptiontimes and processing requirements. For small medical records, thesecosts are usually negligible. However, for very large medical records,such as those that include medical images, the encryption/decryptiontimes and processing requirements can be prohibitive.

More fundamentally, and as embodied in the HIPAA law, the use ofencryption does not, per se, ensure the security of electronic PHI.Indeed, there have bees routine breaches of security in datasets thatwere, in principle, secured using encryption. In the context ofhealthcare, the perceived lack of security undermines patient trust and,thus, adversely impact patient satisfaction.

SUMMARY

The described embodiments relate to a computer system that secures a setof records. This computer system includes: a processor that executes aprogram module; and memory that stores the program module. Duringoperation, the processor executing the program module performssubstitutions for fields in the set of records, where performing a givensubstitution involves replacing a field in the set of records with areplacement field, and the substitutions remove context information inthe set of records while maintaining relevance of the set of records.Then, the processor may generate an artificial set of records based, atleast in part, on the set of records, where a given artificial recordincludes one or more modified portions of the set of records. Next, theprocessor may combine the set of records and the artificial set ofrecords into a second set of records, where at least some phrases orvalues in the second set of records are uniformly distributed.

Note that the replacement field may include random or pseudorandomalphanumeric information.

Moreover, the set of records and the artificial set of records may berandomly or pseudo-randomly ordered in the second set of records.

Furthermore, the substitutions may be predefined. Alternatively oradditionally, the substitutions may be determined based on informationvalue of the fields in the set of records. For example, thesubstitutions may be determined based on a cardinality of the fields inthe set of records.

In some embodiments, the processor reorders fields that includetimestamps in the set of records. These fields may include one or morewords or second values.

Additionally, the processor may modify imaging data in the set ofrecords based on imaging instructions and an invariant signature thatpredicts responses of voxels in at least an individual.

Another embodiment provides a computer-program product for use with thecomputer system. This computer-program product includes instructions forat least some of the operations performed by the computer system.

Another embodiment provides a method for securing the set of records.

The preceding summary is provided as an overview of some exemplaryembodiments and to provide a basic understanding of aspects of thesubject matter described herein. Accordingly, the above-describedfeatures are merely examples and should not be construed as narrowingthe scope or spirit of the subject matter described herein in any way.Other features, aspects, and advantages of the subject matter describedherein will become apparent from the following Detailed Description,Figures, and Claims.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a system that secures a set ofrecords in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.

FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating a method for securing a set ofrecords using the system in FIG. 1 in accordance with an embodiment ofthe present disclosure.

FIG. 3 is a drawing illustrating communication among components in thesystem, in FIG. 1 in accordance with an embodiment of the presentdisclosure.

FIG. 4 is a drawing illustrating securing a set of records in the systemin FIG. 1 in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.

FIG. 5 is a drawing illustrating securing a set of records in thesystem, in FIG. 1 in accordance with an embodiment of the presentdisclosure.

FIG. 6 is a drawing illustrating securing a set of records in the systemin FIG. 1 in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.

FIG. 7 is a drawing illustrating an invariant magnetic-resonance (MR)signature that specifies the response to a surface of magnetic-fieldstrengths in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.

FIG. 8 is a drawing illustrating secure storage of a set of records inthe system in FIG. 1 in accordance with an embodiment of the presentdisclosure.

FIG. 9 is a drawing illustrating secure storage of a set of records inthe system in FIG. 1 in accordance with an embodiment of the presentdisclosure.

FIG. 10 is a drawing illustrating secure storage of a set of records inthe system in FIG. 1 in accordance with an embodiment of the presentdisclosure.

FIG. 11 is a drawing illustrating secure storage of a set of records inthe system in FIG. 1 in accordance with an embodiment of the presentdisclosure.

FIG. 12 is a drawing illustrating secure storage of a set of records inthe system in FIG. 1 in accordance with an embodiment of the presentdisclosure.

FIG. 13 is a drawing illustrating secure storage of a set of records inthe system in FIG. 1 in accordance with an embodiment of the presentdisclosure.

FIG. 14 is a drawing illustrating a secure interface for communicatinginformation in the system in FIG. 1 in accordance with an embodiment ofthe present disclosure.

FIG. 15 is a block diagram illustrating electronic device in the systemof FIG. 1 in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Note that like reference numerals refer to corresponding partsthroughout the drawings. Moreover, multiple instances of the same partare designated by a common prefix separated from an instance number by adash.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In order to secure a set of records, a computer system may selectivelyremove context information and ensure uniform distributions of at leastsome phrases or values in the set of records. In particular, thecomputer system may perform substitutions for fields in the set ofrecords, where performing a given substitution involves replacing afield in the set of records with a replacement field, and thesubstitutions remove the contest information in the set of records whilemaintaining relevance of the set of records. Then, the computer systemmay generate an artificial set of records based, at least in part, onthe set of records, where a given artificial record includes one or moremodified portions of the set of records. Next, the computer system maycombine the set of records and the artificial set of records into asecond set of records, where at least some phrases or values in thesecond set of records are uniformly distributed.

This security technique may enhance the security of the set of recordswithout incurring significant processing and/or latency cost. Forexample, the security technique may secure the set of records withoutrequiring the use of an encryption technique (which can be prohibitivewhen the set of records are large). Consequently, the security techniquemay improve user trust in the aggregation and use of the set of recordsto provide value-added services so the users, and thus may improve theoverall user experience.

In the discussion that follows, an individual or a user may be a person.Moreover, the security technique may be used by any type oforganization, such as a business, which should be understood to includefor-profit corporations, non-profit corporations, groups (or cohorts) ofindividuals, sole proprietorships, government agencies, partnerships,etc. While the security technique may be used in a wide variety ofapplications, in the discussion that fellows the security technique isused in healthcare to secure medical records.

Furthermore, in the discussion that follows, electronic devices and/orcomponents in a system that includes the computer system may communicateusing a wide variety of communication protocols. For example, thecommunication may involve wired or wireless communication. Consequently,the communication protocols may include: an Institute of Electrical andElectronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standard (which is sometimesreferred to as ‘Wi-Fi®,’ from the Wi-Fi Alliance of Austin, Tex.),Bluetooth® (from the Bluetooth Special Interest Group of Kirkland,Wash.), another type of wireless interface (such as anotherwireless-local-area-network interface), a cellular-telephonecommunication protocol (e.g., a 3G/4G/5G communication protocol, such asUMTS, LTE) an IEEE 802.3 standard (which is sometimes referred to as‘Ethernet’), etc. In the discussion that follows, Ethernet and Wi-Fiand/or a cellular telephone communication protocol are used asillustrative examples.

Communication among electronic devices is shown in FIG. 1, winchpresents a block diagram illustrating a system 100 that secures a set ofrecords. In particular, system 100 includes one or more electronicdevices 110 (such as cellular telephones or portable electronic devices,computers, etc.), optional base station 112 in cellular-telephonenetwork 114, optional access point 116, and computer system 118 (whichare sometimes collectively referred to as ‘components’ in system 100).Moreover, computer system 118 may include: a set of records 120 (winchmay be stored in memory or a computer-readable medium, which issometimes referred to as a ‘biovault’), a security engine (or module)122 and a notification engine (or module) 124. In some embodiments, theset of records 120 includes a block chain, i.e., a distributed databasethat maintains a continuously growing list of records (with data,individual transactions, the results of any blockchain executablesand/or programs, as well as timestamps and links to one or more previousblocks) secured from tampering and revision. Therefore, changes to theset of records 120 may be appended to the existing set of records 120.

Note that components in system 100 may communicate with each other via anetwork 126, such as the Internet, a cellular-telephone network and/or awireless local area network (WLAN). In embodiments where thecommunication involves wireless communication, the wirelesscommunication includes: transmitting advertising frames on wirelesschannels, detecting another component in system 100 by scanning wirelesschannels, establishing connections (for example, by transmittingassociation requests), and/or transmitting and receiving packets (whichmay include information for inclusion in the set of records 120,requests for access to information in the set of records 120,notifications, etc.).

Moreover, as described further below with reference to FIG. 15,electronic devices 110, optional base station 112, optional access point116 and computer system 118 may include subsystems, such as a networkingsubsystem, a memory subsystem and a processor subsystem. In addition,electronic devices 110, optional base station 112, optional access point116 and computer system 118 may include radios 128 in the networkingsubsystems. More generally, the components can include (or can beincluded within) any electronic devices with the networking subsystemsthat enable these components to communicate with each other. Note thatwireless communication can compose transmitting advertisements onwireless channels to enable a pair of components to make initial contactor detect each other, followed by exchanging subsequent data/managementframes (such as association requests and responses) to establish aconnection, configure security options (e.g., Internet ProtocolSecurity), transmit and receive packets or frames via the connection,etc.

Moreover, as can be seen in FIG. 1, wireless signals 130 (represented byjagged lines) are transmitted by radios 128 in the components. Forexample, radio 128-1 in electronic device 110-1 may transmit information(such as packets) using wireless signals. These wireless signals may bereceived by radios 128 in one or more of the other components, such asby optional base station 112 or optional access point 116. This mayallow electronic device 110-1 to communicate information to optionalbase station 112 or optional access point 116, and thus, to computersystem 118.

In the described embodiments, processing a packet or frame in acomponent may include: receiving the wireless signals with the packet orframe; decoding/extracting the packet or frame from the receivedwireless signals to acquire the packet or frame; and processing thepacket or frame to determine information, contained in the packet orframe (such as information for inclusion in the set of records 120, arequest, a notification, etc.).

Note that the communication between at least any two of the componentsin system 100 may be characterized by one or more of a variety ofperformance metrics, such as: a received signal strength indication(RSSI), a data rate, a data rate for successful communication (which issometimes referred, to as a ‘throughput’), an error rate (such as aretry or resend rate), a mean-square error of equalized signals relativeto an equalization target, intersymbol interference, multipathinterference, a signal-to-noise ratio, a width of an eye pattern, aratio of number of bytes successfully communicated during a timeinterval (such as 1-10 s) to an estimated maximum number of bytes thatcan be communicated in the time interval (the latter of which issometimes referred to as the ‘capacity’ of a communication channel orlink), and/or a ratio of an actual data rate to an estimated data rate(which is sometimes referred to as ‘utilization’).

As discussed below with reference to FIG. 14, one or more users (such asan individual or a group of individuals) may use electronic device 110-1to request, via network 126, access to information in one or morerecords in set of records 120. If the one or more users are authorizedto access the one or more records, computer system 118 may securely andanonymously provide, via network 126, the requested information (or apointer to the requested information) to electronic device 110-1 via auser interface. Furthermore, notification engine 124 may analyze the setof records 120 and may selectively provide, via network 126,notifications to one or more of electronic devices 110 and, thus, to theassociated users of these electronic devices. For example, thenotifications may include timely health messages that are securely andanonymously provided to at least a user via a user interface.

Moreover, as discussed further below with reference to FIGS. 8-13,information in the set of records 120 may be, at least in part,encrypted or securely hashed and stored separately from the encryptionkey(s) or the secure hashing function(s). For example, encryptedinformation and the associated public encryption keys may be stored inthe set of records 120, and the corresponding private encryption keysmay be stored separately.

Furthermore, as discussed further below with reference to FIGS. 2-7, oneor more users may use one of electronic devices 110 (such as electronicdevice 110-1) to provide, via network 126, information to computersystem 118 for inclusion in one or more records in set of records 120.In response to receiving this information, security engine 122 maysecurely store the information in the one or more records. Inparticular, security engine 122 may: scramble timestamps (and, moregenerally, words or values in a timeline); substitute replacement fields(such as random or pseudorandom alphanumeric information) for fields inset of records 120 (such as based on predefined substitution rules, thecardinality of the fields and, more generally, the information value ofthe fields), and/or generate artificial or fictitious records based on,at least in part the set of records 120 so that at least some of thephrases or values in the combination of the artificial records and theset of records 120 have uniform distributions or frequencies ofoccurrence. Note that security engine 122 may randomly orpseudo-randomly order the positions of the artificial records in the setof records 120.

In some embodiments, security engine 120 may ‘detune’ an invariantsignature that describes or predicts the responses of voxels in abiological lifeform or organism (such as an animal or a human being) toa particular measurement technique based on measurement, imaging orscanning instructions, so that a reversible ‘incorrect’ response of thebiological organism can be stored in the set of records 120. Thisapproach may show security engine 120 to store large amounts of data(such as medical images or imaging data) without requiring that thesefields in the set of records 120 be secured using an encryptiontechnique (such as symmetric or asymmetric encryption, or a securehashing function). Because medical images include very large amounts ofdata, this approach, therefore, may significantly reduce the processingtime and the resources in computer system 118 that are needed to securethe set of records 120.

In these ways, security engine 122 may reduce or eliminate context orcontextual information from the set of records 120 while maintaining therelevance or meaning of the information. This approach may allow thesecured information in the set of records 120 to be accessed whilepreventing unauthorized access to meaningful information in the set ofrecords 120.

Note that the measurement technique may include a wide variety ofnon-invasive measurement techniques, including; a magnetic-resonance(MR) technique, computed tomography, ultrasound imaging, x-ray imaging,positron emission spectroscopy, electron spin resonance,optical/infrared spectroscopy (e.g., to determine a complex index ofrefraction at one or more wavelengths), an electrical measurement (suchas an electrocardiogram, an electromyogram, an electroencephalogram,etc.), proton beam, photoacoustic imaging, other non-destructivemeasurements (such as radar or millimeter-wave scanning), activity orbehavior data for the biological organism (such as data capture using awearable electronic device), measurements performed by nano particles inthe biological organism, chemical composition of fluids (such as blood)measured at arbitrary locations in the biological organismnon-destructively or by drawing a blood sample (e.g., usingmicrofluidics), another quantitative or qualitative characteristic orproperty of the biological organism, etc.

Moreover, the quantitative analysis of MR scans in the measurementtechnique may be facilitated by the use of MR fingerprints of biologicalorganism that are magnetic-field invariant (which are sometimes referredto as ‘magnetic-field-invariant MR signatures’ or ‘invariant MRsignatures’). The invariant MR signatures may describe the dynamic MRresponses of voxels at 3D positions in the one or more biologicalorganisms at arbitrary magnetic-field strengths. Moreover, the invariantMR signatures may be independent of the MR scanners, as well as thespecific scanning instructions magnetic-field strengths and/or pulsesequences), used to acquire MR signals in a variation on MRF (which issometimes referred to as ‘quantitative MRF’ or QMR-X) that were thenused to determine the invariant MR signatures. An invariant MR signaturemay be determined by iteratively converging MR signals of one or moretypes of nuclei in a biological organism, which were acquired by an MRscanner based on scanning instructions, with simulated MR signals (whichare sometimes referred to as calculated MR signals or estimated MRsignals) for the biological organism that are generated using an MRmodel and the scanning instructions.

Furthermore, the measurement technique may be used in conjunction with avariety of MS techniques, including: magnetic-resonance imaging (MRI),magnetic-resonance spectroscopy (MRS), magnetic-resonance spectralimaging (MRSI), magnetic-resonance thermometry (MRT), magnetic-resonanceelastography (MRE), MR fingerprinting (MRF), magnetic-field relaxometry,diffusion-tensor imaging and/or another MR technique (such as functionalMRI, metabolic imaging, molecular imaging, blood-flow imaging, etc.).Note that these MR techniques are each a form of quantitativetensor-field mapping.

In particular, ‘MRI’ should be understood to include generating images(such as 2D slices) or maps of internal structure in a sample (such asanatomical structure in a biological sample, e.g., a tissue sample or apatient) based on the dynamic response of a type of nuclear spin (suchprotons or the isotope ¹H) in the presence of a magnetic field, such asa non-uniform or spatially varying external magnetic field (e.g., anexternal magnetic field with a well-defined spatial gradient). Moreover,MRS should be understood to include determining chemical composition ormorphology of a sample (such as a biological sample) based on thedynamic response of multiple types of nuclear spins (other than or inaddition to ¹H) in the presence of a magnetic field, such as a uniformexternal magnetic field.

Moreover, ‘MRSI’ should be understood to include generating images ormaps of internal structure and/or chemical composition or morphology ina sample using MRS in the presence of a magnetic field, such as anon-uniform or spatially varying external magnetic field. For example,in MRSI the measured dynamic response of other nuclei in addition to ¹Hare often used to generate images of the chemical composition or themorphology of different types of tissue and the internal anatomy of thebiological organism.

Furthermore, in contrast with existing approaches to MRI or MRSI thatusually provide qualitative or ‘weighted’ measurements of a limited setof properties, ‘MRF’ should be understood to include quantitativemeasurements of the properties of a sample by acquiring signalsrepresenting a dynamic or time-dependent magnetization or MR trajectoryfrom different materials in a sample using a pseudorandom pulsesequence. In particular, instead of using repeated, serial acquisitionof data to characterize individual parameters that are of interest, inMRF signals from different materials or tissues are often acquired usinga pseudorandom pulse sequence to determine a unique signal or‘fingerprint’ (e.g., a time-dependent magnetization or MR trajectory).The resulting unique fingerprint of the sample is, in general, afunction of multiple material properties under investigation. Forexample, MRF can provide high-quality quantitative maps of aspin-lattice relaxation time T₁ (which is the time constant associatedwith the loss of signal intensity as components of the nuclear-spinmagnetization vector relax to be parallel with the direction of anexternal magnetic field), a spin-spin relaxation time T₂ (which is thetime constant associated with broadening of the signal during relaxationof components of the nuclear-spin magnetization vector perpendicular tothe direction of the external magnetic field), proton density (and, moregenerally, the densities of one or more type of nuclei) and diffusion(such as components in a diffusion tensor).

Note that ‘magnetic-field relaxometry’ (such as B₀ relaxometry with theaddition of a magnetic-field sweep) may involve acquiring MR images atdifferent magnetic-field strengths. These measurements may be performedon the fly or dynamically (as opposed to performing measurements at aparticular magnetic-field strength and subsequently cycling hack to anominal magnetic-field strength during readout, i.e., a quasi-staticmagnetic-field strength). For example, the measurements may be performedusing un-tuned radio-frequency (RF) coils or a magnetometer so thatmeasurements at the different magnetic-field strengths can be performedin significantly less time.

Additionally, ‘MRE’ should be understood to include measuring thestiffness of a sample using MRI by sending mechanical waves (such assheer waves) through a sample, acquiring images of the propagation ofthe shear waves, and processing the images of the shear waves to producea quantitative mapping of the sample stiffness (which are sometimesreferred, to as ‘elastograms’) and/or mechanical properties (such asrigidity, density, tensile strength, etc.).

Moreover, ‘MRT’ should be understood to include measuring maps oftemperature change to a sample using MRI.

Note that a biological organism may include a tissue sample from ananimal or a person (i.e., a portion of the animal or the person). Forexample, the tissue sample may have been previously removed from theanimal or the person. In some embodiments, the tissue sample is apathology sample, such as a biopsy sample. Thus, the tissue sample maybe formalin fixed-paraffin embedded. However, in other embodiments abiological organism may be in the animal or the person (i.e., an in-vivosample) and/or the measurement technique involves whole-body scans.Furthermore, the measurement technique may also be applied to inanimate(i.e., non-biological) samples of a wide variety of different materials.In the discussion that follows, the biological organism is a person oran individual, which is used as an illustrative example. Moreover, whilethe measurement technique may be used with a wide variety ofnon-invasive measurement techniques, in the discussion that follows MRtechniques, and in particular MRI and MRS, are used as illustrativeexamples.

Although we describe the network environment shown in FIG. 1 as anexample, in alternative embodiments, different numbers or types ofelectronic devices may be present. For example, some embodimentscomprise more or fewer components. As another example, in anotherembodiment, different components are transmitting and/or receivingpackets or frames.

FIG. 2 presents embodiments of a flow diagram illustrating method 200for providing securing a set of records, which may be performed by acomputer system (such as computer system 118 in FIG. 1). Duringoperation, the computer system (such as a processor executing a programmodule and, more generally, software executed in an environment, e.g.,an operating system, of the computer system) performs substitutions(operation 210) for fields in the set of records, where performing agiven substitution involves replacing a field in the set of records(which may include one or more records) with a replacement field, andthe substitutions remove context information in the set of records whilemaintaining relevance of the set of records. Note that the replacementfield may include random or pseudorandom alphanumeric information.Furthermore, the substitutions may be predefined, such as based onpredefined substitution rules (e.g., replace instances of a particularword or phrase with a corresponding substitution). Alternatively oradditionally, the substitutions may be determined based on informationvalue of the fields in the set of records. For example, thesubstitutions may be determined based on a cardinality of the fields inthe set of records.

Then, the computer system may generate an artificial set of records(operation 212) based, at least in part, on the set of records, where agiven artificial record includes one or more modified portions of theset of records.

Next, the computer system may combine the set of records and theartificial set of records (operation 214) into a second set of records,where at least some phrases or values in the second set of records areuniformly distributed. Note that the set of records and the artificialset of records may be randomly or pseudo-randomly ordered in the secondset of records.

In some embodiments, the computer system performs one or more optionaladditional operations (operation 216). For example, the computer systemmay reorder fields that include timestamps in the set of records. Thesefields may include one or more words or second values (which may be thesame or different from values in the fields that were replaced duringthe substitution in operation 210). Alternatively or additionally, thecomputer system may modify imaging data in the set of records based onimaging instructions and an invariant signature that predicts responsesof voxels in at least an individual.

In some embodiments of method 200, there may be additional or feweroperations. Moreover, the order of the operations may be changed, and/ortwo or more operations may be combined into a single operation.

Embodiments of the security technique are further illustrated in FIG. 3,which presents a drawing illustrating communication among components insystem 100 (FIG. 1). In particular, during the security technique,interface circuit 312 in computer system 118 may receive information 314corresponding to the set of records from interface circuit 310 inelectronic device 110-1. This information 314 may be provided toprocessor 316.

After receiving information 314, processor 316 may secure information314. In particular, processor 314 may perform substitutions 324 forfields in the set of records. These substitutions may be based onpredefined substitution rules 320 access by processor 316 in memory 322.Alternatively or additionally, processor 314 may analyze information 314to calculate information values 318 of the fields, and substitutions 324may be based on the information values 318.

Moreover, processor 310 may generate 326 an artificial set of recordsbased, at least in part, on the set of records, and may combine the setof records and the artificial set of records (operation 214) into asecond set of records 328.

Furthermore, processor 316 may reorder 330 fields that includetimestamps in the set of records and/or may modify 332 imaging data inthe set of records based on imaging instructions and an invariantsignature that predicts responses of voxels in at least an individual(and, more generally, a biological organism).

Then, processor 316 may store the result set of records 334 in memory322. In some embodiments, set of records 334 are appended to existingrecords in memory 322, so that no previously stored information is lostor modified.

In addition, processor 316 may store an index 336 that can be used toreverse the operations used to secure information 314 so thatinformation 314 can be recovered in set of records 334.

In this way, the computer system may secure the information in the setof records, such that, even in the event of a security breach (in whichthe set of records are accessed or stolen by an unauthorized user), theinformation may be secure. For example, the reversible substitutions andobfuscation of the information in the set of records may remove thecontext to prevent an unauthorized viewer from extracting meaningfulinformation from the set of records. In addition, the modifications mayinclude reordering that facilitates increased compression of the set ofrecords. However, the modifications to the set of records may preserverelevance (such as fields associated with a particular biologicalorganism and/or a particular transaction, e.g., a doctor's appointment),so the changes to the set of records can be reversed and so theinformation in the set of records can be identified and accessed.Consequently, the security technique may enhance the safety of theinformation in the set of records while preserving its usefulness.Therefore, the security technique may improve compliance with regulatoryrequirements (such as HIPAA), which may increase user trust andsatisfaction.

In an exemplary embodiment, the security technique is used to secure aset of records, such as medical records. In particular, a set of medicalrecords may include individual patient transactions (office visits, labresults, etc.) with associated timestamps. In addition, the set ofmedical records may include metadata for one or more patients. Thismetadata may be included in separate records or may be integrated intothe transactional information. For example, the metadata may include alocation where services were provided.

The information in the set of medical records can be used to directlyidentify a patient, at least in an abstract way. For example, the set ofmedical records may include a patient identifier (such as a numericalvalue).

However, the content of the information in the set of medical recordsand the relationship between different fields in the set of medicalrecords (which collectively are sometimes referred to as ‘context’) canbe used to specifically identify the patient. For example, if a patienthas a particular rare disease and they receive services from a specificphysician at location in city (such as San Francisco), this informationcan be used to determine the identity of the patient. In particular, theinformation can be used in conjunction with social-media posts, zipcodes, travel records, public records, newspaper articles, calendars,known relatives, doctor, and/or other relevant information to uniquelydetermine the identity of the pattern, thereby constituting a breach ofHIPAA regulations and the patient's privacy and trust.

In order to prevent this from happening while maintaining the usefulnessof the set of medical records, the security technique may remove thecontextual information from the set of medical records while maintainingthe relevance or meaning of the information in the set of medicalrecords. For example, as shown in FIG. 4 presents a drawing illustratingsecuring a set of records 400 in system 100 (FIG. 1), fields 412 withtimestamps 410 in a timeline 414 may be scrambled or reordered 416. Insome embodiments, scrambling or reordering timestamps 412 involvesreplacing timestamps 410 with random or pseudorandom values.

Moreover, the security technique may include at least selectiveinformation hiding. In particular, constant substitutions may beperformed over the set of medical records, such that a particular wordor phrase (e.g., San Francisco) is replaced by a corresponding random orpseudorandom alphanumerical value (‘A7cU3lz’). However, otherinformation, such as the patient identifier, may not be substituted. Thesubstitutions are illustrated in FIG. 5, which presents a drawingillustrating securing a set of records 500 in system 100 (FIG. 1). Inparticular, content 512 (such as words, phrases and/or values) in atleast some of fields 510 is replaced by substitutions 514.

In some embodiments, at least some of the content in fields 510 in theset of medical records are substituted or replaced. In particular, bynot performing substitutions for all the words, phrases and values inthe set of medical records, a smaller state of substitutions needs to betracked in a look-up table for use when reversing the substitutions (aswell as the reordering and/or the obfuscating). For example, thesubstitutions may be prioritized based on the information value offields 510. In some embodiments, the substitutions are based on thecardinality of the content in fields 510, such that fields with highercardinality (e.g., three or more values, which is used as anillustration and is not intended to be limiting) are replaced.Alternatively or additionally, the substitutions may be based on thefrequency of occurrence in the set of medical records and/or theusefulness of the content in determining the identity of the patient.

Furthermore, because the frequency of occurrence of content in the setof medical records can be used to determine the relative importance ofinformation and, thus, to identify the patient, the security techniquemay include generating an artificial or fictitious set of medicalrecords based the set of medical records (such as based on the initialfrequencies of occurrence of words, phrases and/or values in at leastsome of the fields). This is shown in FIG. 6, which presents a drawingillustrating securing a set of records 600 in system 100 (FIG. 1),including real medical records 610 and artificial medical records 612.

Note that the artificial set of medical records may incorporate at leastportions of the set of medical records. Moreover, the artificial set ofmedical records may be randomly or pseudorandomly combined with the setof medical records (e.g., in random order) such that the finalfrequencies of occurrence or distributions of the words, phrases and/orvalues in at least some of the fields is uniform or flat (or anotherdistribution, such as a normal distribution). Therefore, the storedmedical records may include real and fake longitudinal health records.Furthermore, note that this approach may be applied to the medical dataas well as the associated metadata in the set of medical records.

As noted previously, the changes applied to the set of medical recordsor information that can be used to reverse the changes may be stored inan index or a look-up table that is associated with the patientidentifier, so that, as needed, the original information in the set ofmedical records can be restored. Note that the index or look-up tablemay be stored separately from the set of medical records and may beseparately secured (e.g., using a secure hashing function, encryption,etc.).

As described previously, in some embodiments the computer system uses apredetermined invariant signature and measurement instructions tointentionally generate incorrect data (such as imaging data) that isscored in the set of records (e.g., in a separate location in memoryfrom the invariant signature and the measurement instructions). This mayallow large amounts of data to be stored without requiring the use ofencryption. Moreover, the errors included in the incorrect data may besubsequently reversed when a request to access the data is received. Forexample, an integral equation (such as a convolution or a correlationintegral equation) may be used to calculate the correct data based on agenerating function (such as a Green's function). This approach mayallow a computationally efficient pipeline to restore the correct data,which can then be provided to the user that requested it.

As so illustration, we now describe an invariant signature for MR (whichis referred to as an ‘invariant MR signature’). The invariant MRsignature may be based on an MR model of the dynamic response of voxelsin a biological organism to an external magnetic field and measurementconditions that are described or specified in scanning instructions(e.g., magnetic-field strengths, pulse sequences, the voxel size, one ormore spectra, one or more types of nuclei, etc.). Stated differently,the MR model may accurately predict MR signal evolution or response forthe voxels in the biological organism over a range of parameters (T₁,T₂, proton density, off-resonances, environment, location, temperature,pulse sequences, etc.) using the Bloch equations, full Liouvilliancomputations or another simulation techniques.

Using the Bloch equations as an illustrative example, the MR model maybe a 3D model of voxels in a portion of a biological organism (and, moregenerally, a biological organism), and may include parameters in theBloch equations for each of the voxels. In particular, with aquasi-static magnetic field B₀ along the z axis, the Bloch equations are

${\frac{{dM}_{x}(t)}{dt} = {{\gamma \cdot \left( {{\overset{\rightarrow}{M}(t)} \otimes {\overset{\rightarrow}{B}(t)}} \right)_{x}} - \frac{M_{x}(t)}{T_{2}}}},{\frac{{dM}_{y}(t)}{dt} = {{\gamma \cdot \left( {{\overset{\rightarrow}{M}(t)} \otimes {\overset{\rightarrow}{B}(t)}} \right)_{y}} - \frac{M_{y}(t)}{T_{2}}}},{and}$${\frac{{dM}_{z}(t)}{dt} = {{\gamma \cdot \left( {{\overset{\rightarrow}{M}(t)} \otimes {\overset{\rightarrow}{B}(t)}} \right)_{z}} - \frac{{M_{z}(t)} - M_{0}}{T_{1}}}},$where γ is the gyromagnetic ratio,

denotes a vector cross product and {right arrow over (B)}(t)=(B_(x)(t),B_(y)(t), B₀+×B_(x)(t)) is the magnetic field experienced by a type ofnuclei in the biological organism. The parameters in the Bloch equationsmay include T₁, T₂, a density of a type of nuclei, diffusion,velocity/flow, temperature, and magnetic susceptibility. Note that theremay be different parameters for different types of nuclei for each ofthe voxels. Moreover, note that the Bloch equations are asemi-classical, macroscopic approximation to the dynamic response of themagnetic moments of the type of nuclei in the biological organism to atime-varying magnetic field. For example, there may be 67 M cells in a 1mm³ voxel.

By performing multiple measurements under different conditions, theunderdetermined solution space for the parameters in the Bloch equationsfor the biological organism may be constrained and solved. For example,if a portion of the biological organism included one voxel, there may be4-10 MR model parameters (which specify an invariant MR signature) thatneed to be determined for a particular type of tissue. If the voxelincludes M types of tissue, there may be 4M-10M MR model parameters(which specify M invariant MR signatures) that need to be determined forthe particular type of tissue. As the number of voxels increases, thiscan appear to be a daunting problem.

However, because different types of nuclei have different Larmorfrequencies, the spatial distribution of the types of nuclei and theirlocal concentrations may be determined from the measured MR signals.Then, a predefined anatomical template for the biological organism (or aportion of the biological organism), with associated initial parametersfor an MR model, may be scaled to match the spatial distribution of thetypes of nuclei and their local concentrations.

Next, for a type of tissue (such as a particular organ), the MR modelparameters may be iteratively refined as the size of the voxels isprogressively decreased (and, thus, the number of voxels is increased).This analysis may be driven by the error between the measured MR signalsand simulated MR signals using the MR model. Over time, the focus duringthe training will be on the residual regions with errors that are largerthan a convergence criterion. For example, the parameters in the MRmodel may be trained based on measured MR signals at one magnetic-fieldstrength and then the error may be determined or estimated based on thepredictions of the MR model, at another magnetic-field strength.Furthermore, note that initially the MR model may assume that there isno contribution or interaction between different voxels. However, as theerror and the voxel size is reduced, subsequently such contributionsand/or interactions may be included when training the MR model.

In order to facilitate this fitting or computational approach, themeasurement technique may determine ‘surface signatures,’ as opposed to1D signatures. For example, using measurements at multiplemagnetic-field strengths or in the presence of known magnetic-fielddisturbances (such as rotation), a set of MR trajectories may bedetermined as ‘fingerprints’ that can be used to determine the invariantMR signature(s). Note that each MR trajectory may be defined by amagnetic-field function rather than a fixed magnetic-field strength.

In an exemplary embodiment, a simulation that is used to determine theMR model may be vertex/voxel centric. Using a physical model (such as aBloch-equation-based model) running at each vertex, the system may‘apply’ pulse sequences or disturbance to the physical model of thebiological organism being scanned. For example, a message may bebroadcast to the vertices that describe the disturbance in terms ofphysical laws. Each of the vertices may compute its predicted change instate and the resulting forces and energies, which are then relayed asmessages to adjacent vertices about the forces and energies exportedfrom that vertex. When all the vertices have generated a message, themessage has been forwarded to the adjacent vertices and the state of thesystem has been updated, a time interval in the calculation may becomplete. This approach can be generalized so that the message isforwarded to non-cyclical paths of length N (where N is an integer)radiating out from the vertex to improve the accuracy of the simulation.

Once the state has been updated, a computational technique can be runover the new computed state and then compared to the measured state. Theerror may be the difference between the predicted state and the measuredstate. As the computational technique is applied, the system maydetermine how to optimally assign the current state to each vertex in away that reduces or minimizes the global error. Next, the system maychoose a new set of perturbations for the system and may broadcast theseas a new message to the vertices, as well as executing this disturbancephysically on the biological organism being scanned. In this way, thesystem may provide real-time or near-real-time analysis and feedbackduring the measurement technique.

Thus, the inverse problem of determining the MR model parameters basedon measured MR signals may be ‘solved’ by minimizing the error ordifference between the measured MR signals and simulated MR signals thatare generated based on the MR model, characteristics of an MR scanner(such as magnetic-field inhomogeneity) and the scanning instructionsused to acquire the measured MR signals. In some embodiments, theinverse problem is solved using one or more computational techniques,including: a least-squares technique, a convex quadratic minimizationtechnique, a steepest descents technique, a quasi-Newton technique, asimplex technique, a Levenberg-Marquardt technique, simulated annealing,a genetic technique, a graph-based technique, another optimizationtechnique and/or Kalman filtering (or linear quadratic estimation).

Note that the inverse problem may be solved using dynamic programming.In particular, the problem may be divided up and performed by multiplecomputers in parallel, e.g., in a cloud-based computing system. Forexample, a particular thread may attempt to solve the inverse problemfor particular scanning instructions. Multiple potential parametersolutions generated by the computers (or processors) may be combined(e.g., using linear superposition) to determine an error metric that isminimized using the one or more computational techniques.

Moreover, the inverse problem may be solved Iteratively by firstattempting to find suitable parameters (e.g., parameters that minimizethe error between the MR signals and simulated MR signals) for the MRmodel using a coarse voxel size and then progressively finding suitableparameters with smaller voxel sizes. Note that the final voxel size usedin this iterative procedure may be determined based on the gyromagneticratio of a type of nuclei being scanned. Furthermore, the voxel size orlocations may also be chosen so that a voxel is evenly portioned into aset of subvoxels, or so that there is certain amount of overlap withpreview voxel sizes to effectively ‘oversample; the overlapping regionand potentially further localize where an MR signal originates. Thislast technique may be akin to shifting the entire gradient system in oneor more dimensions by a distance dx that is less than a characteristiclength of the voxels (such as a length, a width or a height of thevoxels). In some embodiments, the voxel size in the MR model is smallerthan that used in the MR scans (i.e., the MR model may use asuper-resolution technique).

Additionally, the MR model may include simulations of dynamics, such asmotion associated with: respiration, a heartbeat, blood flow, mechanicalmotion, etc. (Thus, there may be additional terms in the Bloch equationsfor diffusion, thermometry, spectroscopy, elastography, etc.Consequently, the MR model may be based on the Bloch-Torrey equations,etc.) For example, when a voxel contains a space that has a fluidflowing through it (such as in a vein), the flow of the liquid may besimulated by building a map of the flow directions and velocitymagnitudes in the biological organism being scanned to be accounted forit the computation of the invariant MR signature. Furthermore, whenscanning a human or an animal, the MR model may include the restingmotion (such as that associated with respiration, a heartbeat, etc.). Inorder to facilitate calculation of the MR model, measured MR signalsand/or other temporal measurements may be synchronized with or relativeto a reference clock or a biological time period.

The MR model may be used to predict bow the biological organisms willrespond to particular scanning instructions. In particular, the MR modelmay be used to simulate or estimate the MR signals for a particular MRscanner having particular characteristics, for particular scanninginstructions and/or for a particular biological organism (which may havea medical history, previous MR scan results, patterns of breathing,patterns of movement, etc.) Stated different, an invariant MR signature(which is based on the MR model) may be used to determinerepresentations or projections (i.e., the MR signals) in particularcontexts, such as based on the particular characteristics of the MRscanner, the particular scanning instructions and/or the particularbiological organism.

Thus, the MR model may be determined using active learning. Inparticular, the MR model may be iteratively fit or determined based on‘queries’ generated by a learning system or a learning engine (which maybe implemented in computer system 114 in FIG. 1). The queries generatedby the learning engine may include different magnetic-field strengthsB₀, different electromagnetic pulse sequences and/or differentultrasonic pulse sequences that are based on confidence intervals forparameters in the MR model. Consequently, the learning engine may usethe measured MR signals in response to these queries to determineunknown parameters in the MR model and/or parameters having a pooraccuracy (such as a confidence interval greater than 0.1, 1, 5 or 10%).More generally, the adaptive learning may be based on a wide variety ofmeasurements, such as optical/infrared spectroscopy, x-ray, computedtomography, proton beam, photoacoustic, ultrasound, etc.

While the preceding discussion used the Bloch equations as anillustrative example, in other embodiments full Liouvillian computations(such as a Liouville supermatrix of interactions between two or moreelements) or another simulation technique are used. Note that the MRsignals computed or predicted using the MR model may be sampled at arate equal to or higher than twice the Nyquist frequency of MR signalsacquired during an MR scan.

FIG. 7, which presents a drawing illustrating an invariant MR signaturethat specifies the response to a surface of magnetic-field strengths,summarizes the preceding discussion of determining parameters for one ormore MR models that accurately predict MR signals and their use in thebiovault. In particular, MR signals or trajectories acquired atdifferent magnetic-field strengths may be combined into a set of MRsignals that specify the response to the surface of magnetic-fieldstrengths. This response may be used to determine one or more invariantMR signatures 700.

Once the invariant MR signature(s) are known, they can be used toreversibly obscure MR signals or data that are stored in the set ofrecords. For example, a systematic offset can be intentionallyintroduced into an invariant MS signature to detune the invariant MRsignature and, thus, to generate incorrect data for the biologicalorganism. The impact of this offset can be subsequently removed from theincorrect data using a generating function that is convolved with theincorrect data, thereby restoring the correct MR signals or data.

In addition to securing the set of records, the identities of users(such as patients), physicians or healthcare providers, etc., who accessthe set of records in the computer system and/or who receivenotifications from the computer system based on the set of records mayalso be protected by anonymizing (and, thus, eliminating) edges ortraceable communication paths during such communication. This approachmay further protect the identities of users of system 100 (FIG. 1).While many of the preceding embodiments avoided the use of encryption,in general the following embodiments leverage encryption and/or securehashing to secure the set of records and to protect the identifies ofthe users. We now describe these embodiments.

As more medical information becomes digitized, the need for securestorage of the medical information is becoming more important. Whilepatients may want to enable researchers to use their data, they areoften prevented from doing, so by fears about security and anonymity.Moreover, other users may not be comfortable with their data beingincluded in any databases because they do not trust institutions withtheir data. While the embodiments of the security technique that aredescribed below are illustrated in the context of healthcare, thisapproach can be used is a wide variety of industries where data needs tobe securely shared with trusted advisors and/or opened up for anonymizedresearch, while allowing a user to have full control over access totheir identity information. For example, the security technique may beused in personal finance (e.g., a financial advisor may have access to afinancial account, as can the compliance department in a financialinstitution, but the identity of the user can be maintainedanonymously).

The security technique may facilitate improved security for users byseparately storing identity information and sensitive data, therebygiving the users control over their data, while selectively allowingtrusted access and general anonymized access to other trusted parties oradvisors (such as a physician). Moreover, the security technique mayalso include secure messaging between, users (e.g., between a patientand a doctor, an account holder and a financial advisor, etc.), securenotices or notifications (e.g., a notice associated with a medicalrecord that is automatically generated and that can only be read by apatient), secure access logs (e.g., any doctor or researcher thataccesses the data of a patient may have their access logged, and theaccess log may be stored securely and may only be viewable by thepatient or an authorized user), and/or connecting users creating aconnection between a user and their doctor, which can enable the user tosecurely share information with their doctor in the future).

In some embodiments, at least some of the data and user information inthe set of medical records, as well as associated communications, arestored in a manner that is not directly accessible to the computersystem. In particular, at least some of the information in the set ofmedical records may be encrypted and/or securely hashed, and theencryption key and the secure bashing function (such as SHA-256) may bestored separately from the encrypted information or may be encryptedusing different encryption keys from the one or more encryption keysthat were used to encrypt the information. In some embodiments, theencrypted information is stored in the set of records along with theassociated public encryption key, and the corresponding privateencryption key is stored separately.

As shown in FIG. 8, which presents a drawing illustrating secure storageof a set of records, the set of records may include encrypted andunencrypted information. In particular, secure data structure 800 mayinclude a user-identity table 810, a user-record table 812, and amedical-record table 814. The user-record table 812 may provide a linkbetween the user identity entries stored in the user-identity table 810and record entries the medical-record table 814, and the information inthe user-record table 812 may be encrypted such that the identityinformation entries stored in the user-identity table 810 may besecurely separated from the medical record information stored in themedical-record table 814. Note that the tables may all be included inthe same data structure (such as a text file, a string, a database,etc.), they can be stored in separate data structures, and/or the tablescan be stored in a distributed system, such as a cloud-computing system.

The user-identity table 810 may include one or more user-identityentries. The user-identity entries can include identifying informationabout a user (e.g., a patient, a doctor, an animal, an organization orinstitution, etc.). For example, user-identity table 810 may include: auser identifier, user information (such as a name of the user, abirthdate of the user, credentials of the user, a photograph of theuser, a list of relatives of the user), a public encryption key of apublic encryption key-private encryption key pair associated with theuser and/or an encrypted patient identifier (which is described furtherbelow). The corresponding private encryption key can be stored inuser-record table 812 as a token or may be encrypted using a password ora biometric identifier that is associated with the user (such as afingerprint or a retina scan) and that is carried on their person or ina personal device (such as a portable computing device or smartphone).

In some embodiments, the entries in the user-identity table 810 caninclude an encrypted patient identifier (which may be different from theuser identifier), and the patient identifier may be encrypted using thepublic encryption key of the public encryption key-private encryptionkey pair associated with the user. The public encryption key-privateencryption key pair associated with the user may be generated or createdwhen a user is first created in the computer system, and multiple publicencryption key-private encryption key pairs can be used by a single user(e.g., so that the user may have redundant encryption-key access in casea token containing a private encryption key is lost, discarded orcompromised). Note that the encrypted patient identifier can bedecrypted using the private encryption key of the public encryptionkey-private encryption key pair associated with the user. If stored inthe user-identity table 810, the patient identifier may be encryptedusing the user's public encryption key, and can be decrypted using theuser's private encryption key, which may facilitate faster look-ups ofmedical records.

Moreover, the medical-record table 814 may include one or moremedical-record entries, be it a single datum (such as a patient weight)to a full quantitative MR scan. Medical-record entries may be created inthe presence of an account holder, and these medical-record entries aresometimes referred to as ‘root records.’ A root record that does notreference any other records. For example, a common root record is arecord of a patient visit. Note that each medical record may have anassociated public encryption key-private encryption key pair. The publicencryption key for a medical record may be stored with the medicalrecord. The corresponding private encryption key associated with themedical record may be encrypted and stored in a look-up table, such asuser-record table 812. Note that when a patient signs into the computersystem or provides their login credentials (e.g., using their cellulartelephone), the computer system may create a visit record and may insertthe record identifier and private encryption key into the look-up table(such as the user-record table 812).

The public encryption key of the public encryption key-privateencryption key pair associated with each medical record can be used totest the authenticity of attempts to access the medical records viaaccess tokens. Moreover, the other records inserted based on a patient'svisit can referenced using a visit record identifier. Therefore, at noother point during the patient's visit does the patient identity have tobe accessed.

Additionally, each medical record entry in the medical-record table 814may include a visit identifier in order to record information captureddaring the same visit to a medical facility (e.g., a blood test, anx-ray, an MRI, a urine sample, a hydration measurement, blood pressure,images of the ears, nose, throat, skin and body temperature, etc.).

The ‘record references’ may include one or more record that the recordis in reference to or linked to, such as derivative medical records. Forexample, derivative medical records or record references may include amedical history update record that points to the patients visit (root)record or a model for analysis that is derived from raw scan data, forexample, a difference between, two or more medical (root) records (e.g.,a comparison of blood pressure between two visits). Additional medicalrecords can include raw data (including timestamps, MRS captureparameters and signals, MR fingerprinting parameters and signals, etc.)and metadata (such as data generated from or in response to the MRdata). The current height and or historical height measurements, currentweight and or historical weight measurements, current blood pressure andor historical blood pressure, a medical history, a family medicalhistory, genome sequencing done on the individual and/or their family(or a subset of their family), current symptoms, previous medicalimages, previous blood work, previous microbiome work, previous urineand/or stool analysis, temperature measurement or thermal imagingreadings, optical pictures of the patient (including, but not limitedto, eyes, ears, throat, nose, etc.), body-impedance measurements,measurements pertaining to a subjects hydration level or diet, previoussurgeries, hospital stays, medical laboratory test results (such asbiopsies), treatments, medications currently being taken, allergies,etc. In particular, the raw MR data can include, but is not limited to:raw MR signal data, raw capture timestamps, and metadata, which caninclude, but is not limited to, optional segmentation data, study logs,optional anomaly detection results (which, for a voxel, may includemembership in one or more anomalies), optional radiologistidentifications, and/or optional registration alignments (which can helpin registering images faster using point-set registration or any otherregistration technique).

In some embodiments, meta information or metadata stored in entries inthe medical-record table 814 may include: a record identifier toidentify each unique medical record in the medical-record table 814, aninsertion/creation date to indicate when the record was created or addedto the table, and/or a pattern identifier. The patient identifier canenable querying of medical records in the medical-record table 814 bythe patient, for example, in order to view the changes in medicalrecords of a patient over time, etc.

Note that user-record table 810 may be a look-up table that associatesthe user with their records. At least a portion of the body of thisrecord may be encrypted so that it is only accessible in the presence ofthe user's private encryption key. More specifically, the user-recordtable 812 can include entries containing unencrypted user identifiers,and also can include an encrypted body of encrypted medical-record orrecord identifiers, and encrypted private encryption keys associatedwith the public encryption key-private encryption key pair associatedwith each medical record, both of which may be encrypted using thepublic encryption key associated with the user identifier. (Note thatthe body of each entry in the user-record table 812 can be encryptedwhen the user records are created.) The user-record table 812 mayprovide a link between the user identity entries stored In theuser-identity table 810 and record entries the medical-record table 814and, because at least a portion of the information is encrypted, theidentity-information entries stored in the user-identity table 810 maybe stored securely and separately from the medical-record informationstored in the medical-record table 814. As noted previously, at leastportions of each entry in the user-record table 812 may be encryptedusing the user's public encryption key (and can be decrypted usinguser's private encryption key), and each user record in the user-recordtable 812 may contain the encrypted medical-record identifier, and theencrypted private encryption key that proves ownership of the medicalrecord, which can be verified using the public encryption key that isstored with the medical record. (Thus, each medical record may include apublic encryption key-private encryption key pair associated with therecord, and the public encryption key may be stored alongside or withthe record.) Moreover, for each user identifier, the record identifierand the private encryption key of the public encryption key-privateencryption key pair associated with each medical record may be encryptedwith the user's private encryption key, so there is no way to associatethe identity with medical record without the user's private encryptionkey.

As shown in FIG. 9, which presents a drawing illustrating secure storageof a set of records, secure data structure 900 may include user-identitytable 810, user-record table 812, medical-record table 814, and anindividual-medical-record access table 816. Theindividual-medical-record access table 816 may create a new log entry inthe individual-medical-record access table 816 every time a medicalrecord/root record is accessed, and the access log entry may beencrypted with the public encryption key associated with the medicalrecord being accessed. For example, a patient may access their ownmedical history to review their historical blood pressure. Alternativelyor additionally, their family doctor may review their records asrequested by the patient. To the extent that, a user or a patient allowsresearchers access to the data (either anonymously or non-anonymously),the patient can track any researchers or other accesses to their medicalrecords, and possibly information about that request such as the dataaccessed, when, by whom and for what purpose.

The goal in these embodiments of the security technique is to keep or tomaintain access records in the form of an auditable access log. However,such access logs could compromise the other anonymization efforts in thesecurity technique if it is not properly designed. In order to addressthis challenge, when a record is accessed, the access information may bestored encrypted against the public encryption key assigned to themedical record. In this way, the owner of the medical record can view(or export) the access history data, but it cannot be accessed by thecomputer system or a third party, and it also cannot be tampered with orspoofed. Any access by way of a token should also include any grantinformation (but not the signature, so the token cannot be re-used), aswill be described further below. Note, therefore, that the grantinformation may be included in or specified by the token.

Medical record access logs can be decrypted using the private encryptionkey associated with the medical record because each user record maycontain the encrypted medical-record identifier, and the encryptedprivate encryption key may be used to generate/sign an access token (aswill be described below with reference to FIG. 11) for a useridentifier. Afterwards, for each user identifier, the record identifierand the private encryption key of the public encryption key-privateencryption key pair associated with the record may be encrypted usingthe user private encryption key, so there is no way to associateidentity with the record without the user private encryption key.Therefore, subsequently, the medical record access logs can be decryptedfrom user-record table 812 using the user private encryption key.

Similarly, as shown in FIG. 10, which presents a drawing illustratingsecure storage of a set of records, secure data structure 1000 mayinclude user-identity table 810, user-record table 812, andmedical-record table 814, and a patient-notice table 818. A new noticeentry in the patient-notice table 818 may be created every time a noticerelating to a medical record/root record is accessed, and the body ofthe notice entry may be encrypted using the public encryption keyassociated with the medical record being accessed.

If the computer system needs to alert the user about something (such aswhen a test result is available), the computer system may need a way toassociate this message with a user without knowing who the owner of agiven record is. The patient-notice table 818 may only make the patientand record identifiers accessible while keeping the actual message dataencrypted. Note that only one of the two identifiers may be required forthis operation, but the patient identifier may be optionally included inorder to make look-ups faster and this may not compromise security ifthe patient identifier is already used for other reasons (e.g., linkingaccessible information from multiple medical records to a patient forresearchers with anonymized data access).

The message data, and any attachments, may be encrypted using the publicencryption key of the medical record. Because the computer system maynot know which user the notice is for, the computer system may not beable to use the public encryption key associated with the user. Instead,the computer system may use the public encryption key associated withthe medical record. Therefore, only the intended user may have access tothe private encryption key associated with the medical record requiredto view the notice.

The entries in the patient-notice table 818 may include a medical-recordidentifier (e.g., to identify which medical record the notice isassociated with), and optionally, a patient identifier can be stored inthe user-identity table 810, encrypted using the user's publicencryption key, and which can be decrypted by the user's privateencryption key, which can enable faster look-ups of medical records ornotices. Note that the patient identifier, which can be used to identifythe patient that the notice is associated with, if used, can only bedecrypted from an entry in the user-identity table 810 using a user'sprivate encryption key, so the user must be authorizing such a fasterlook-up operation.

In some embodiments, the patient notices include system-generatedmessages, such as: notifications of derivative records or referencerecords. For example, a derivative record may include: a new result froma blood test, a new result based on research related to a recent bloodpressure result, a new animated image of a patient's knees compiled fromtheir last four MRI scans, etc. The derivative records can be based onautomated analysis of medical records, updates from doctors,specialists, radiologists or other practitioners, or any other suitablesource. Note that the notices can be automatically generated for medicalrecords, and each notice can be encrypted using the public encryptionkey of the associated medical record.

In embodiments where a patient identifier is not used to speed up thelook-up process of providing notices to a patient, a user's privateencryption key can be used to decrypt the encrypted record identifiersand their corresponding private encryption keys that are associated withthe medical record for the notice. After the private encryption keyassociated with the medical record is decrypted by the user's privateencryption key, then any encrypted notices (or similarly,individual-medical record access logs, as described previously withreference to FIG. 9) associated with the medical-record identifier canbe decrypted using the decrypted private encryption key associated withthe medical record.

Moreover, as shown in FIG. 11, which presents a drawing illustratingsecure storage of a set of records, secure data structure 1100 mayinclude a user-identity table 810, a user-record table 812, and amedical-record table 814, and a granted-access token table 820. Thegranted-access token table 820 may create new access tokens in thegranted-access token table 820 every time a new access token is created.Furthermore, the granted-access token table 820 may also delete accesstokens in the granted-access token table 820 every time an access tokenexpires.

In some embodiments, separating or distinguishing anonymized access forresearch purposes from access by users is facilitated by an accesstoken. The access token may describe or specify the accessible records,the expiration of the grant, and any other privileges, such as theability to re-share the record with another professional.

Several approaches and techniques may be used for the token. In someembodiments, the token includes a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) WebTokens (JWT). However, a variety of cryptographically signed messageformats (such as s/mime) can be used.

A JWT is a cryptographically signed JSON object. In some embodiments,the computer system embeds a record identifier, as well as any othergrant information, into the token. Then, the comparer system may signthe JWT using the private encryption key associated with the medicalrecord to which access is being granted (after it is decrypted fromuser-record table 812), so the JWT can be verified and cannot bemodified. Moreover, the private encryption key associated with themedical record to which access is being granted may be used togenerate/sign an access token for a user identifier, which can provideaccess for a user who is associated with the medical record (e.g., ifthey want to view their own records). Alternatively, if the user wishesto share the medical record with another user or party (e.g., theirdoctor, or perhaps a relative), they can share access with the otheruser or party using the JWT by specifying a different user identifier.

For example, if a patient wants to send the results of an MR scan totheir primary care doctor, the user may do so by specifying the medicalrecord and the recipient (their doctor in this case) using anapplication or another software program executing on their electronicdevice. The application or the software program may use the privateencryption key associated with this medical record to create or generatean access token specifying that the doctor (using the doctor's useridentifier) can access the medical-record identifier (as well as it'sdecedents, derivative records, record references, etc.) during a time orexpiration interval (such as 30 days). However, the doctor may not sharethe data with anyone else. The generated access token for the doctor canthen be attached to a user record associated with the doctor.Furthermore, a software program executing on the doctor's electronicdevice or client may use this access token to request the record fromthe computer system and may present it for review. Note that thecomputer system may: verify the access token against the publicencryption key associated with the medical record (i.e., that the accesstoken was signed using the private encryption key associated with themedical record), serve the requested record data, and store the accessinformation in the access log for this medical record. In someembodiments, the access token is encrypted using the public encryptionkey of the doctor, and the doctor may use their private encryption keyto decrypt the access token before use.

The access from each token may be logged (as shown and described in FIG.9), and any access based on a token may also include grant informationfrom the token (but not the signature, so the token cannot be re-used).Note that the access log may then be encrypted using the publicencryption key associated with the medical record.

As shown in FIG. 12, which presents a drawing illustrating securestorage of a set of records, secure data structure 1200 may include auser-identity table 810, a user-record table 812, and a medical-recordtable 814, a user address book 822, and a user address book 824. Theaddress books of both the first user and the second user may beencrypted using the respective or corresponding public encryption keyfor each user (thus, the user address book of a given user may beencrypted using their public encryption key). In some embodiments,address books 822 and 824 may be stored in the user-identity table 810,and may be encrypted with the public encryption key associated with eachuser. Moreover, address books 822 and 824 may then be decrypted usingthe private encryption key associated with each user when requested(which is similar to how the previously discussed patient identifier isstored in the user-identity table 810). Furthermore, each user may storeand decrypt their encrypted address book locally on their electronicdevice(s) using their private encryption key.

The purpose of address books 822 and 824 may be to prevent a user fromarbitrarily looking up any other user in the computer system for privacyreasons. Instead, the user may have an encrypted address book ofverified contacts. This verification process may occur in person, usinga device-to-device token exchange, and/or using handshaking or othertechniques known to those skilled in the art. As a user adds anotherperson to their secure directory/address book, e.g., in person, eachuser may share their user identifier and public encryption key, as wellas other optional information (such as their full name, nickname,identification number, geolocation, medical specialty for doctors, atype of condition for patients, etc.) with the other. In someembodiments, a two-factor authentication code or a verification code (orcodes) is sent from a third party server or from a medical-recordmanagement system to one or both users to ensure the transaction ofadding each user to the other's address book is valid. Note that,depending on the trust between the users, and the security levelrequired for the application, the address book may not need to besecured/encrypted. However, the encryption may provide an additionallayer of security.

During a transaction, each user may verify that the public encryptionkey they are giving to the other party is, in fact, their own, usingtheir private encryption key, and this authorization may also be used tocreate access tokens for the newly added user in their address book atany time in the future after the users are in each other's addressbooks. After exchanging the public encryption keys, the users may beable to send encrypted messages back and forth (which is describedfurther below).

For example, electronic device 110-1 of a first user A and electronicdevice 110-2 of a second user B may, respectively (and which areexternal to secure data structure 1200), include the first user'sprivate encryption key and the second user's private encryption key, andeach user's private encryption key may be encrypted, and decrypted basedon a biometric identifier provided by a biometric sensor (such as afingerprint scanner, a retina scanner and/or another suitable biometricdevice) or a password entered using a user interface on a givenelectronic device. Note that, once the first user and the second userare in each other's address books, they may be able to subsequentlygenerate access tokens for each other.

In some embodiments, a first user and a second user may exchange theirrespective user public encryption keys in their address books, and thefirst user and the second user may each encrypt their address books withtheir respective public encryption keys. Then, the first user may useelectronic device 110-1 to execute a program module or an application tocreate a message to send to the second user and may encrypt the messagewith the public encryption key of the second user (after decryptingtheir address book with the first user's private encryption key. Next,electronic device 110-1 may store the encrypted message (from the firstuser to the second user) on the computer system, such as in messagetable 826. The second user may use electronic device 110-2 to execute aprogram module or an application to query the computer system using orbased on the second user's user identifier. In response, electronicdevice 110-2 may receive matching results, including encrypted messagesfrom the computer system, and may electronic device 110-2 may optionallydisplay a notification or an inbox status message to the second user ona display. Moreover, electronic device 110-2 may request biometric data(such as from a biometric sensor) or a password input (such as via atouch-sensitive display) from the second user. Furthermore, electronicdevice 110-2 may decrypt the second user's private encryption key withthe biometric data or the password, and then may decrypt the messagefrom the first user using the decrypted private encryption key of thesecond user. Additionally, electronic device 110-2 may display thedecrypted notice on the display.

As shown in FIG. 13, which presents a drawing illustrating securestorage of a set of records, secure data structure 1300 may include auser-identity table 810, a user-record table 812, and a medical-recordtable 814, and a message table 826. Because one of the functions of thecomputer system is to allow a user to share their data with a medicalprofessional (e.g., another user, possibly with additional privileges),the computer system may implement messaging in a way that facilitatesthe sharing of the data without compromising the privacy concerns. Forexample, in principle a non-trusted third party could derive, based on auser's interaction with an oncologist, critical information about thatuser or that, user's medical history. The message table 826 may allow amessage to be delivered securely because everything about the message isencrypted using the receiver's public encryption key. Note that thefield ‘Access Tokens’ may include references to specific medical recordsthe receiver is intended or allowed to access.

For example, a first user A may send a message to a second user B who isin their encrypted address book (as described previously with referenceto FIG. 12). The first user may decrypt their encrypted address book andmay select the user they wish to message. Based on the security levelrequired for the application, the address book may not need to besecured/encrypted. However, in some embodiments such encryption mayprovide an additional layer of security. Then, the first user may createa message (e.g., on the first user's electronic device 110-1) and mayencrypt the message body with the second user's public encryption key,which can be decrypted from the first user's encrypted address bookusing the first user's private encryption key. The message may then betransmitted from the first user's electronic device 110-1 to thecomputer system, and secure data structure 1200 may store the encryptedmessage in message table 826 indexed by the user identifier of thesecond user. (As in FIG. 12, note that electronic devices 110 may beexternal to secure data structure 1300.) Moreover, the second user mayfetch encrypted messages for their user identifier by querying messagetable 826 in the computer system using their user identifier, and thenreceiving the matching results, including encrypted messages associatedwith their user identifier on the second user's electronic device 110-2.Note that the second user's electronic device 110-2 may capture abiometric input or identifier or a password input from the second userto decrypt the second user's private encryption key, and then the seconduser may decrypt the encrypted messages addressed to the second userusing the second user's private encryption key. Note that the messagesmay include: access tokens granting access to specific medical records,requests for processing, requests for procedures, and requests forscheduling, comments from doctors, specialists, radiologists, or otherpractitioners, etc.

Thus, a notice relating to a medical record can be generated by thefirst user using electronic device 110-1, and the generated notice canbe encrypted (e.g., by the computer system) using the public encryptionkey associated with the associated medical record of the second user.Subsequently, electronic device 110-2 may request biometric data (suchas from a biometric sensor) or a password input (such as via atouch-sensitive display) and may decrypt the second user's privateencryption key based on the biometric data or the password. Next,electronic device 110-2 may poll the computer system based on the seconduser's user identifier. In response, electronic device 110-2 may receiveencrypted record identifiers and encrypted record private encryptionkeys associated with the user identifier from the computer system.Moreover, electronic device 110-2 may decrypt the private encryptionkey(s) and record identifier(s) associated with the medical record usingthe decrypted user private encryption key. Furthermore, electronicdevice 110-2 may query the computer system using the decrypted recordidentifier(s) and may receive matching results, including the encryptednotices (or access logs) associated with the medical-recordidentifier(s). Using the decrypted private encryption key (which isassociated with the medical record), electronic device 110-2 may decryptthe encrypted notices (or access logs) associated with the medicalrecord, and then electronic device 110-2 may display the decryptednotice on a display. Note that a similar process can be used to enableusers to view access logs (such as based on a patient identifier)because they may be encrypted, handled, and stored in almost identicalfashion.

In some embodiments, messages and notifications are communicatedanonymously between the computer system and the users using a secureinterface. This is shown in FIG. 14, which presents a drawingillustrating a secure interface 1400 for communicating Information insystem 100 (FIG. 1). This secure interface may implement a secure join1410 between a user message space 1412 and a computer-system messagespace 1414. Input notifications or messages 1416 from the computersystem may be encrypted using user's public encryption keys based onuser identifiers or patient identifiers. Moreover, secure interface 1400may perform a one-way mapping to output notifications or messages 1418to eliminate traceable edges during the communication. Furthermore, fakenotifications or messages may also be generated and accessed (forexample, using an automated agent or computer), so that the pattern orfrequency of occurrence of the communication is uniform.

We now describe embodiments of an electronic device. FIG. 15 presents ablock diagram illustrating an electronic device 1500, such as one ofelectronic devices 110 or computer system 118 in FIG. 1. This electronicdevice includes processing subsystem 1510, memory subsystem 1512, andnetworking subsystem 1514. Processing subsystem 1510 includes one ormore devices configured to perform computational operations. Forexample, processing subsystem 1510 can include one or moremicroprocessors, application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs),microcontrollers, programmable-logic devices, and/or one or more digitalsignal processors (DSPs).

Memory subsystem 1512 includes one or more devices for storing dataand/or instructions for processing subsystem 1510 and networkingsubsystem 1514. For example, memory subsystem 1512 can include dynamicrandom access memory (DRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), and/orother types of memory. In some embodiments, instructions for processingsubsystem 1510 in memory subsystem 1512 include: one or more programmodules or sets of instructions (such as program module 1522 oroperating system 1524), which may be executed by processing subsystem1510. Note that the one or more comparer programs may constitute acomputer-program mechanism. Moreover, instructions in the variousmodules in memory subsystem 1512 may be implemented in: a high-levelprocedural language, an object-oriented programming language, and/or inan assembly or machine language. Furthermore, the programming languagemay be compiled or interpreted, e.g., configurable or configured (whichmay be used interchangeably in this discussion), to be executed byprocessing subsystem 1510.

In addition, memory subsystem 1512 can include mechanisms forcontrolling access to the memory. In some embodiments, memory subsystem1512 includes a memory hierarchy that comprises one or more cachescoupled to a memory in electronic device 1500. In some of theseembodiments, one or more of the caches is located in processingsubsystem 1510.

In some embodiments, memory subsystem 1512 is coupled to one or morehigh-capacity mass-storage devices (not shown). For example, memorysubsystem 1512 can be coupled to a magnetic or optical drive, asolid-state drive, or another type of mass-storage device. In theseembodiments, memory subsystem 1512 can be used by electronic device 1500as last-access storage for often-used data, while the mass-storagedevice is used to store less frequently used data.

While FIG. 15 illustrates electronic device 1500 as including memorysubsystem 1512, in some embodiments memory subsystem 1512 includesremotely accessible memory, such as: a cloud-based storage system, ahigh-capacity network attached mass-storage device (e.g., networkattached storage), an external hard drive, a magnetic-tape backupsystem, a medical records archive service, or any other suitable archivedevices.

In some embodiments, blocks of data are stored in memory subsystem 1512using a blockchain or similar cryptographic hash technology to detectunauthorized modification or corruption of records. Moreover, the datacan be anonymized so that the identity associated with a subject isanonymous unless the subject gives permission or authorization for thisinformation to be released.

Networking subsystem 1514 may include one or more devices configured tocouple to and communicate on a wired and/or wireless network (i.e., toperform network operations), including: control logic 1516, an interfacecircuit 1518, one or more antennas 1520 and/or input/output (I/O) port1530. (While FIG. 15 includes one or more antennas 1520, in someembodiments electronic device 1500 includes one or more nodes 1508,e.g., a pad, which can be coupled to one or more antennas 1520. Thus,electronic device 1500 may or may not include one or more antennas1520.) For example, networking subsystem 1514 can include a Bluetoothnetworking system, a cellular networking system (e.g., a 3G/4G networksuch as UMTS, LTE, etc.), a universal serial bus (USB) networkingsystem, a networking system based on the standards described in IEEE802.11 (e.g., a Wi-Fi networking system), an Ethernet networking system,and/or another networking system.

Networking subsystem 1514 includes processors, controllers,radios/antennas, sockets/plugs, and/or other devices used for couplingto, communicating on, and handling data and events for each supportednetworking system. Note that mechanisms used for coupling to,communicating on, and handling data and events on the network for eachnetwork system are sometimes collectively referred to as a ‘networkinterface’ for the network system. Moreover, in some embodiments a‘network’ between the electronic devices does not yet exist. Therefore,electronic device 1500 may use the mechanisms in networking subsystem1514 for performing simple wireless communication between the electronicdevices, e.g., transmitting advertising or beacon frames and/or scanningfor advertising frames transmitted by other electronic devices asdescribed previously.

Within electronic device 1500, processing subsystem 1510, memorysubsystem 1512, and networking subsystem 1514 are coupled together usingbus 1528. Bus 1528 may include an electrical, optical, and/orelectro-optical connection that the subsystems can use to communicatecommands and data among one another. Although only one bus 1528 is shownfor clarity, different embodiments can include a different number orconfiguration of electrical, optical, and/or electro-optical connectionsamong the subsystems.

In some embodiments, electronic device 1500 includes a display subsystem1526 for displaying information on a display, which may include adisplay driver and the display, such as: a liquid-crystal display, amulti-touch touchscreen or a touch-sensitive display, an opticalprojector, a laser projector, a holographic display, or any othersuitable display for displaying 2-dimensional or 3-dimensional images.

Moreover, electronic device 1500 may include a security subsystem 1532,which may include one or more biometric sensor(s) and/or may implementpassword authorization. For example, the one or more biometric sensorsmay include: a fingerprint scanner, a retina scanner, and/or anotherbiometric sensor that can capture biometric information that is used forauthentication and/or authorization.

Electronic device 1500 can be (or can be included in) any electronicdevice with at least one network interface. For example, electronicdevice 1500 can be (or can be included in): a desktop computer, a laptopcomputer, a subnotebook/netbook, a server, a workstation, a tabletcomputer, a smartphone, a cellular telephone, a smart watch, aconsumer-electronic device, a portable computing device, an accesspoint, a router, a switch, communication equipment, test equipment, asecurity camera, an aviation drone, a nanny camera, a wearableappliance, and/or another electronic device.

Although specific components are used to describe electronic device1500, in alternative embodiments, different components and/or subsystemsmay be present in electronic device 1500. For example, electronic device1500 may include one or more additional processing subsystems, memorysubsystems, networking subsystems, display subsystems and/or audiosubsystems. Additionally, one or more of the subsystems may not bepresent in electronic device 1500. Moreover, in some embodiments,electronic device 1500 may include one or more additional subsystemsthat are not shown in FIG. 15. Also, although separate subsystems areshown in FIG. 15, in some embodiments, some or all of a given subsystemor component can be integrated into one or more of the other subsystemsor component(s) in electronic device 1500. For example, in someembodiments program module 1522 is included in operating system 1524.

Moreover, the circuits and components in electronic device 1500 may beimplemented using any combination of analog and/or digital circuitry,including: bipolar, PMOS and/or NMOS gates or transistors. Furthermore,signals in these embodiments may include digital signals that haveapproximately discrete values and/or analog signals that have continuousvalues. Additionally, components and circuits may be single-ended ordifferential, and power supplies may be unipolar or bipolar.

An integrated circuit may implement some or all of the functionality ofnetworking subsystem 1514, such as a radio. Moreover, the integratedcircuit may include hardware and/or software mechanisms that are usedfor transmitting wireless signals from electronic device 1500 andreceiving signals at electronic device 1500 from other electronicdevices. Aside from the mechanisms herein, described, radios aregenerally known in the art and hence are not described in detail. Ingeneral, networking subsystem 1514 and/or the integrated circuit caninclude any number of radios. Note that the radios in multiple-radioembodiments function in a similar way to the described single-radioembodiments.

In some embodiments, networking subsystem 1514 and/or the integratedcircuit include a configuration mechanism (such as one or more hardwareand/or software mechanisms) that configures the radio(s) to transmitand/or receive on a given communication channel (e.g., a given carrierfrequency). For example, in some embodiments, the configurationmechanism can be used to switch the radio from monitoring and/ortransmitting on a given communication channel to monitoring and/ortransmitting on a different communication channel (Note that‘monitoring’ as used herein comprises receiving signals from otherelectronic devices and possibly performing one or more processingoperations on the received signals, e.g., determining if the receivedsignal comprises an advertising frame, receiving the Input data, etc.)

While communication protocols compatible with Ethernet and Wi-Fi or acellular-telephone communication protocol were used as illustrativeexamples, the described embodiments of the security technique may beused in a variety of network interfaces. Furthermore, while some of theoperations in the preceding embodiments were implemented in hardware orsoftware, in general the operations in the preceding embodiments can beimplemented in a wide variety of configurations and architectures.Therefore, some or all of the operations in the preceding embodimentsmay be performed in hardware, in software or both. For example, at leastsome of the operations in the security technique may be implementedusing program module 1522, operating system 1524 (such as a driver forinterface circuit 1518) and/or in firmware in interface circuit 1518.Alternatively or additionally, at least some of the operations in thesecurity technique may be implemented in a physical layer, such ashardware to interface circuit 1518.

While program module 1522 is illustrated as being resident on andexecuted by electronic device 1500, in some embodiments a user ofelectronic device 1500 may interact with a web page that is provided byanother electronic device, and which is rendered by a web browser onelectronic device 1500. In some embodiments, at least a portion ofprogram module 1522 (such as software or an application) executing onelectronic device 1500 may be an application tool that is embedded inthe web page, and that executes in a virtual environment of the webbrowser. Thus, the application tool may be provided to the user via aclient-server architecture. Note that program module 1522 executed byelectronic device 1500 may be a standalone application or a portion ofanother application that is resident on and that executes on electronicdevice 1500.

In the preceding description, we refer to ‘some embodiments.’ Note that‘some embodiments’ describes a subset of all of the possibleembodiments, but does not always specify the same subset of embodiments.Moreover, note that the numerical values provided are intended asillustrations of the communication technique. In other embodiments, thenumerical values can be modified or changed.

The foregoing description is intended to enable any person skilled inthe art to make and use the disclosure, and is provided in the contestof a particular application and its requirements. Moreover, theforegoing descriptions of embodiments of the present disclosure havebeen presented for purposes of illustration and description only. Theyare not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the present disclosure tothe forms disclosed. Accordingly, many modifications and variations willbe apparent so practitioners skilled in the art, and the generalprinciples defined herein may be applied to other embodiments andapplications without departing from the spirit and scope of the presentdisclosure. Additionally, the discussion of dm preceding embodiments isnot intended to limit the present disclosure. Thus, the presentdisclosure is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown, butis to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles andfeatures disclosed herein.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for accessing information in a set ofrecords, comprising: by a processor: receiving, via an interfacecircuit, a request for the information, wherein the request isassociated with an electronic device corresponding to an entity;confirming that the entity is authorized to access the set of records;recovering the information from a secured set of records, wherein therecovering involves: removing one or more artificial set of records fromthe secured set of records, so that at least some phrases or values inthe set of records are not uniformly distributed; and restoring contextinformation in the set of records while maintaining relevance of the setof records by performing substitutions for replacement fields in the setof records, wherein performing a given substitution involves replacing areplacement field in the set of records with a field, and wherein thecontext information was previously removed from the set of records andcorresponds to different fields in the set of records that, at least inpart, indirectly identify an individual; and providing, via theinterface circuit, the information for the electronic device.
 2. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the field replaces random or pseudorandomalphanumeric information in the replacement fields.
 3. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the recovering involves reordering the set of records,so that the set of records are not randomly or pseudo-randomly ordered.4. The method of claim 1, wherein the substitutions are predefined. 5.The method of claim 1, wherein the substitutions are determined based oninformation value of the fields in the set of records.
 6. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the substitutions are determined based on a cardinalityof the fields in the set of records.
 7. The method of claim 1, whereinthe recovering involves reordering additional fields that includetimestamps in the set of records.
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein theentity includes one of: a patient, a medical provider, and an insurancecompany.
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein the recovering involvesmodifying imaging data in the set of records based on imaginginstructions and an invariant signature that predicts responses ofvoxels in at least an individual.
 10. A non-transitory computer-readablestorage medium for use in conjunction with a computer system, thecomputer-readable storage medium storing a program module that, whenexecuted by the computer system, accesses information in a set ofrecords by causing the computer system to perform one or more operationscomprising: receiving, via an interface circuit in the computer system,a request for the information, wherein the request is associated with anelectronic device corresponding to an entity; confirming that the entityis authorized to access the set of records; recovering the informationfrom a secured set of records, wherein the recovering involves: removingone or more artificial set of records from the secured set of records,so that at least some phrases or values in the set of records are notuniformly distributed; and restoring context information in the set ofrecords while maintaining relevance of the set of records by performingsubstitutions for replacement fields in the set of records, whereinperforming a given substitution involves replacing a replacement fieldin the set of records with a field, and wherein the context informationwas previously removed from the set of records and corresponds todifferent fields in the set of records that, at least in part,indirectly identify an individual; and providing, via the interfacecircuit, the information for the electronic device.
 11. Thecomputer-readable storage medium of claim 10, wherein the field replacesrandom or pseudorandom alphanumeric information in the replacementfields with one or more words or second values.
 12. Thecomputer-readable storage medium of claim 10, wherein the recoveringinvolves reordering the set of records, so that the set of records arenot randomly or pseudo-randomly ordered.
 13. The computer-readablestorage medium of claim 10, wherein the substitutions are predefined.14. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 10, wherein thesubstitutions are determined based on information value of the fields inthe set of records.
 15. The computer-readable storage medium of claim10, wherein the substitutions are determined based on a cardinality ofthe fields in the set of records.
 16. The computer-readable storagemedium of claim 10, wherein the recovering involves reorderingadditional fields that include timestamps in the set of records.
 17. Thecomputer-readable storage medium of claim 10, wherein the entityincludes one of: a patient, a medical provider, and an insurancecompany.
 18. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 10, whereinthe recovering involves modifying imaging data in the set of recordsbased on imaging instructions and an invariant signature that predictsresponses of voxels in at least an individual.
 19. A computer system,comprising: an interface circuit; a processor, coupled to the interfacecircuit, configured to execute a program module; memory, coupled to theprocessor, configured to store the program module, wherein, whenexecuted by the computer system, the program module causes the computersystem to access information in a set of records by performing one ormore operations comprising: receiving, via the interface circuit, arequest for the information, wherein the request is associated with anelectronic device corresponding to an entity; confirming that the entityis authorized to access the set of records; recovering the informationfrom a secured set of records, wherein the recovering involves: removingone or more artificial set of records from the secured set of records,so that at least some phrases or values in the set of records are notuniformly distributed; and restoring context information in the set ofrecords while maintaining relevance of the set of records by performingsubstitutions for replacement fields in the set of records, whereinperforming a given substitution involves replacing a replacement fieldin the set of records with a field, and wherein the context informationwas previously removed from the set of records and corresponds todifferent fields in the set of records that, at least in part,indirectly identify an individual; and providing, via the interfacecircuit, the information for the electronic device.
 20. The computersystem of claim 19, wherein the substitutions are determined based on acardinality of the fields in the set of records.